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Abstract— We revisit the classical log-linear learning algo-
rithm for optimal allocation of DC/AC converters and syn-
chronous machines in radial power systems. The objective is to
assign to each generator node a type; either a synchronous ma-
chine or a DC/AC converter in closed-loop with droop control,
while minimizing the steady state angle deviation relative to
an optimum associated with unknown optimal configuration of
synchronous machines and DC/AC converters. Additionally, we
study the robustness of the learning algorithm against uniform
drop in the line susceptances and with respect to well-defined
feasibility region describing admissible power deviations. We
show guaranteed probabilistic convergence to maximizers of
the perturbed potential function with feasible power flows and
demonstrate our theoretical findings via simulative example of
power network with six generation units.
I. INTRODUCTION
With increased share of renewable energy resources (wind,
solar, fuel cells, etc.) in the electrical grid, it is of an
uttermost importance to understand the ramification of het-
erogeneous power generation on the operation and mainte-
nance of normal grid conditions. Since a large percentage of
generation in power system will not be based on synchronous
machines, the dominant dynamics justified by their presence,
is not valid anymore [1]. This sheds new lights into the on-
going research to enhance the grid performance for efficient
power generation using tools from optimization theory [2].
In particular, the field of game theory has gained more
and more attention over the years as it intersects several
disciplines. Game theory offers a rich set of model ele-
ments, solution concepts, and evolutionary notions. Within
the realm of engineering systems, a key element in the use
of game theory is to design incentives to obtain desirable
behaviors [3], [4]. A game theoretical model is more than
just a dynamic feedback system, as each player learns the
environment, which in turn learns the player [4].
Different game theoretic concepts have previously been
applied to formulate and solve optimization problems in
power systems. For example, in [5], a feedback controller
is proposed based on population games to achieve frequency
regulation and economic efficiency. The authors of [6], [7]
design distributed control laws for decision process of indi-
vidual sources in small-scale DC power systems and propose
a proportional allocation mechanism using non-cooperative
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game theory, respectively. In [8], coalitional game approach
allows consumers to cooperatively share storage with each
other, while minimizing electricity consumption cost. More-
over, game theory has been leveraged for pricing and market
mechanisms in power systems [9]–[11] as well as security
assessment and mitigation of attacks [12], [13].
Learning in game theory provides a framework for de-
signing, analyzing and controlling multi-agent systems [14]
and is well-understood in the literature with guaranteed
asymptotic results, for example, convergence to a Nash equi-
librium. Learning algorithms have been extensively studied
in potential games [15], [16] and are designed with the
goal to implement a prescriptive control approach, where the
guaranteed limiting behavior represents a desirable operating
condition [17]. In particular, log-linear learning originally
introduced in [18] is a learning algorithm that ensures that
the action profiles that maximize the global objective of
the multi-agent system coincide with the potential function
maximizers. The inclusion of the noise function enables the
players to occasionally make mistakes corresponding to sub-
optimal actions. As the noise vanishes, the probability that
a player selects a best response or an optimal action goes to
one [17].
In this work, our contributions are put together as follows:
First, we consider the log-linear learning algorithm in its
classical formulation [18] through new lenses by applying it
to an optimal allocation problem for radial power systems,
where the goal is to assign a type (DC/AC converter in
closed-loop with droop control or synchronous machine)
to each generation unit, by minimizing steady state angle
deviations with respect to an optimum. Our problem is
motivated by the planning and construction phase of the
power grid that focuses on a rational structure of the power
network and presents a particular configuration of the net-
work that can meet the special needs of the future smart grid
[19]. Second, we investigate the robustness of the learning
algorithm against uniform drop in the line susceptances,
representing uncertainty in the knowledge of their exact
value, while steady state power deviations are confined to
well-defined feasibility region. This is performed by deter-
mining an upper bound on the allowed line susceptance
drop. Additionally, we show that the learning algorithm for
optimal allocation converges, in the probabilistic sense, to
an optimal configuration that corresponds to maximizers
of the perturbed potential function. Third, we validate our
findings on a power system setup consisting of six generation
units arranged according to a line graph. We simulate the
power system with unperturbed as well as perturbed weight
susceptances and discuss the convergence to an unknown
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optimal configuration for a susceptance perturbation within
the derived theoretical bound.
The remainder of this paper unfurls as follows. Section II
introduces the power systems model, as well as game-
theoretic setup and formulates optimal allocation problem for
radial power systems. In Section III, we study the robustness
of the learning algorithm with respect to uniform drop in
the line susceptances, provide interpretation to our results
and link these to other well-studied optimization problems.
Finally, Section IV illustrates our results by providing nu-
merical simulations of the learning algorithm for optimal
allocation on a network consisting of aligned six- generation
units.
II. LEARNING FOR OPTIMAL ALLOCATION IN POWER
SYSTEMS
A. Modeling of power systems
We consider a power network model, defined by a graph
G = (V,E) in radial (or acyclic) undirected network, where
V is the set of n (possibly) heterogeneous generation units.
We consider inductive loads with constant susceptances,
absorbed in the lines. Define {1, . . . ,n} as the index set of all
the generation units in the power system. The voltage mag-
nitude Vi at the i-th bus is assumed to be constant and equal
to 1 per unit. Let E be the set of m edges (purely inductive
transmission lines) with susceptance weight be > 0, e ∈ E .
We denote by I ∈ Rn×m the incidence matrix of the graph
G, and by Ni the neighbor set of the i-th generation unit
(synchronous machine [20], or DC/AC converter in closed-
loop with the droop control [21]). Under the assumption of
quasi-stationary steady state, the swing equation of the i-th
synchronous machine with inertial constant mi > 0, damping
coefficient di > 0 describes the i-th generation unit dynamics
as follows,
miθ¨i(t) =−diθ˙i(t)− ∑
j∈Ni
bi j sin(θi(t)−θ j(t))+P0,i, (1)
where θi(t) ∈ R denotes the (virtual) voltage phase angle,
P0,i ∈R is a constant power input that represents mechanical
or DC side power input and Pi = ∑ j∈Ni bi j sin(θi(t)−θ j(t))
is the electrical power injected from the i-th generation into
the neighbor set Ni.
The dynamics in (1) describes both DC/AC converters that
are equipped with droop control, or the rotor dynamics of
synchronous machines, where the difference between the two
models lies in the values of the damping di and inertia mi.
In the sequel, we denote the phase angles of the generation
units at steady state by θ s =
[
θ s1, . . . ,θ
s
n
]>, induced by
configuration (or arrangement) of the generation units s =
[s1, . . . ,sn]>, where si ∈ S = {M,C} is the type (synchronous
machine (M), or DC/AC converter (C)) of the i-th generation
unit. The steady state angles are described by the following
equation,
diθ˙ si =− ∑
j∈Ni
bi j sin(θ si j)+P0,i, θ
s
i j = θ
s
i −θ sj . (2)
After defining P0 =
[
P0,1, . . . ,P0,n
]>, D = diag{di}i=1...n
and 1n as the vector of all ones, we make the following
assumption.
Assumption 1 (Flow feasibility [21]). Consider the power
system model at steady state in (2). We assume that
||diag({bi j}(i, j)∈E)−1 ·ξ s||∞ < 1,
for all configurations s, where ξ s ∈Rm is the vector of edge
flows satisfying,
P0−ω0 D1n = I ξ s, (3)
and ω0 = ∑ni=1 P0,i/∑
n
i=1 di.
For a given configuration s = [s1, . . . ,sn]> through the
damping matrix D, the steady state angles θ si j are determined
from,
sin(I>θ s) = diag({bi j}(i, j)∈E)−1ξ s, (4)
with sin(z) = [sin(z1), . . . ,sin(zm)]> and the edge flow vector
ξ s is defined in (3).
It is important to mention that, the damping parameter of
synchronous machines is considered to have higher value,
than that of DC/AC converters in closed loop with droop
control and enters the power balance equation (3) through
the damping matrix D. This establishes the link between the
chosen configuration s= [s1, . . . ,sn] and the resulting relative
steady state angles θ si j. Thus, the steady state angles depend
on the type of the i-th generation unit si, through the damping
values di and are obtained from the n- decoupled equations
in (4).
Assumption 1 is equivalent to the existence of unique and
synchronized steady state angles θ s = [θ s1, . . . ,θ
s
n], that are
phase cohesive, i.e., θ si j < γ,γ ∈ [0,pi/2[ satisfying (4). For
more details about the derivation of (3) and (4), we refer the
interested reader to Theorem 2 in [21].
Let θ0 = [θ01, . . .θ0n]> be the initial angle vector and
θ s∗ = ω01n t + θ0 denote the optimal phase angles θ s
∗
=
[θ s∗1 , . . . ,θ
s∗
n ]
> corresponding to an optimal, yet unknown
configuration [s*1, . . . ,s
*
n], s
∗
i ∈ S = {M,C}. The optimal an-
gles θ s∗ can be derived, from solving an optimal power
flow [22] for the underlying power system model by setting
sin(I>θ s∗) = diag({bi j}(i, j)∈E)−1ξ s∗ , where ξ s∗ satisfies (3),
falls the optimal configuration s∗ of DC/AC converters and
synchronous machines encoded in the damping matrix D∗,
is known.
In this work, we consider unknown optimal configura-
tion s∗, and the optimal values of the phase angles θ s∗ can be
obtained, for example, from historical records of the optimal
power system operation.
B. Game-theoretic setup
Consider a game (V,A,{ui}i∈V), where V is a finite set of
players and A is a set of actions. Each player i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}
has a utility function ui (a.k.a reward or payoff function),
which associates with every action x ∈ X = AV the utility
ui(x) that player i gets, when every other player j ∈ Ni is
playing action x j ∈A. Let x−i = (x1,x2, . . . ,xi−1,xi+1, . . . ,xn)
denote the profile of all players’ actions, other than player i.
Definition II.1 (Potential game, [3]). A game (V,A,{ui}i∈V)
is called a potential game, if there exists a function U :X →
R (referred to as the potential function of the game), such
that for any two configurations x,y ∈ X and a player i ∈ V ,
we have that,
ui(yi,x−i)−ui(xi,x−i) =U(yi,x−i)−U(xi,x−i).
A potential game as defined above requires perfect align-
ment between the global objective and the players local
objective functions, so that the change in a player’s utility
that results from a unilateral change in strategy equals the
change in the global utility [3].
Definition II.2 (Pure strategy Nash equilibrium). A (pure
strategy) Nash equilibrium for the game (V,A,{ui}i∈V) is
an action configuration x∗ ∈ X , such that,
x∗i ∈ Bi(x∗−i), i ∈ V,
where Bi(x−i) = argmaxxi∈Aui(xi,x−i) is the best response
function.
A pure Nash equilibrium as given in Definition II.2,
represents a configuration, in which no player has a unilateral
incentive to deviate from his current action.
Definition II.3 (Noisy best response). Consider a game
(V,A,{ui}i∈V). The continuous-time asynchronous noisy
best response dynamics is a Markov chain X(t) with state
space X = AV , where each player is equipped with an
independent rate-1 Poisson clock. If the clock ticks at time
t, the player i updates his actions to s, chosen form a
conditional probability:
P(Xi(t+1) = s|Xi(t)) = e
1/τ(t)·ui(s,X−i)
∑Xi∈Ai e1/τ(t)·ui(Xi,X−i)
, (5)
where τ(t) > 0 is the temperature or noise function that
controls the smoothness of (5) and is a decreasing function
of time [17].
The learning algorithm described in Definition II.3 is
known as log-linear algorithm, and is well studied in game
theory and classically described by the following rules [17]:
• Players’ utility functions constitute a potential game.
• Players update their strategies one at a time, which is
referred to as asynchrony.
• At any stage, a player can select any action in the action
set.
• Each player assesses the utility for alternative actions,
assuming that the actions of all other players remain
fixed.
C. Optimal allocation problem
In this section, our goal is to assign a type si ∈S = {M,C}
to each generation unit i = 1 . . .n, represented by a Markov
chain X(t) = [X1(t), . . . ,Xn(t)]> with Xi(t) = si ∈ S being the
generation unit type of player i at time t. This assignment
is performed so that, the phase angles at each unit are the
closest to their given optimal relative angles θ s∗i j , derived
from an unknown optimal configuration s∗ of the converters
and synchronous machines. In other words, we aim to find a
valid generation unit assignment s = [s1, . . . ,sn]> by finding
X = [X1, . . .Xn]>, so as to minimize the pairwise interaction
cost,
c(Xi(t) = si, X j(t)) = |sin(θ si j)− sin(θ s
∗
i j )|, (6)
where θ si j = θ si −θ sj and θ s
∗
i j = θ s
∗
i −θ s
∗
j are steady state angle
relative differences, resulting from choosing the type si for
the i-th generation unit, given the generation types of the
neighboring units s j, j 6= i.
The cost function c(Xi,X j) in (6) depends implicitly on
the configuration X = s, si ∈ S, i = 1 . . .n, through (3) and
(4).
At every time instance t, one generation unit g(t) ∈
{1 . . .n} chosen uniformly at random wakes up and updates
its type si ∈ S . The conditional probability of updating the
i-th generation unit to type si is given by,
P(Xi(t+1) = si | X(t), g(t) = i) = e
−1/τ(t)∑ j∈Ni bi j c(si,X j(t))
∑
k∈S
e−1/τ(t)∑ j∈Ni bi j c(k,X j(t))
,
(7)
where the function τ(t) is defined as in (5).
Note that τ(t) determines how likely is player i to select
a sub-optimal action: As τ(t)→ ∞, player i will select any
unit type Xi with equal probability. As τ(t)→ 0, player i will
select a best response Xi ∈ Bi(X−i).
We assign to each player an objective function that
captures the player’s marginal contribution to the potential
function. This translates to assigning to each player the
following utility function
ui(Xi,X−i) =− ∑
j∈Ni
bi j c(Xi,X j). (8)
Next, we define the potential function given by,
U(X) =−1
2 ∑i, j∈V,
(i, j)∈E
bi j c(Xi(t),X j(t)). (9)
Following Assumption 1, the aforementioned potential
function (9) achieves zero if and only if all generation units
are aligned with an optimal configuration s∗ = [s∗1, . . . ,s
∗
n]
>
of converters and synchronous machines. This can be seen
from,
|sin(θ si j)− sin(θ s
∗
i j )|= 0,
if and only if θ si j = θ s
∗
i j , for all i = 1, . . . ,n (due to phase
angle cohesiveness). In fact, given optimal angles θ s∗ , we
can write (3) as
D1n =
1
ω0
[
P0−I diag({bi j})sin(I>θ s∗)
]
and deduce that D = D∗ and hence s = s∗.
Note that an optimal configuration s∗ = [s∗1, . . .s
∗
n]
> is a
Nash equilibrium of the game, given by the utility func-
tion (8), because an optimal configuration maximizes the
potential function (9). However, a Nash equilibrium X∗ =
[X∗1 , . . . ,X
∗
n ]
> can be sub-optimal, i.e., U(X∗)< 0, and hence
may fail to correspond to an optimal configuration.
In a repeated potential game, the stationary distribution
pX (t) = P(X(t) = X) is given by [18],
pX (t) =
e1/τ(t)·U(X)
∑X∈X e1/τ(t)·U(X)
.
Here again, the greater the temperature as τ(t) → ∞, the
closer the conditional probability (5) to a uniform distribution
over the player action response. As τ(t) → 0, the only
stochastically stable states (see Definition 4, in [23]) of the
Markov process are the joint actions that maximize the poten-
tial function. This shows the probabilistic convergence of the
log-linear learning algorithm, and hence that of the learning
algorithm for optimal allocation, to a Nash equilibrium that
maximizes the potential function [17], [24].
III. ROBUSTNESS OF OPTIMAL ALLOCATION PROBLEM
A. Drop in transmission line susceptances
In this section, we investigate the implication of an addi-
tive unknown perturbation in transmission line susceptances
on the probabilistic convergence of the log-linear algorithm
and its robustness with respect to a well-defined feasibility
region of admissible power flows.
Under these settings, we define the utility function for the
i-th generation unit as follows,
uˆi(X) =− ∑
j∈Ni
bˆi j(δ )c(Xi(t),X j(t)), (10)
where bˆi j(δ ) = bi j−δ , 0≤ δ < bi j, as well as the perturbed
potential function,
Uˆ(X) =−1
2 ∑i, j∈V,
(i, j)∈E
bˆi j(δ )c(Xi(t),X j(t)). (11)
Hence, δ represents a uniform drop in the line suscep-
tances so that the perturbed weights are still positive [25].
A drop in the susceptance value can model uncertainty in
the knowledge about the line susceptance, or also a uniform
decrease in the susceptance value, due to the presence of
identical capacitive load absorbed in the lines.
Note that for given optimal relative angles in the cost (6),
satisfying (3),(4) with perturbed susceptances bˆi j, it holds
that max
Xi
ui(X) = max
Xi
uˆi(X), for all Xi ∈ Bi(X−i).
In the sequel, we assume that Assumption 1 holds with
perturbed weights, for all 0≤ δ < bi j, (i, j) ∈ E and config-
urations s., i.e.,
‖diag(bˆi j)−1ξˆ s‖∞ < 1,
where ξˆ s represent edge flows that solve the power balance
equations (4) with the perturbed weights bˆi j > 0.
Let θˆ si j denote the relative steady state angles resulting
from solving for the power balance equations (3), (4) with
the perturbed line susceptances bˆi j, for all i, j ∈ V . Next, we
introduce a set of steady state angles, characterizing a fea-
sibility region described by the maximal steady state power
injected by each of the converters, relative to their optimal
power output, i.e., corresponding to an optimal configuration
s∗ of the unperturbed susceptances bi j, as follows,
Pα(θˆ s) ={
θˆ s ∈ Rn, max
i=1...n
| ∑
j∈Ni
bˆi j(δ )sin(θˆ si j)− ∑
j∈Ni
bi j sin(θ s
∗
i j )|< α
}
,
(12)
where ∑ j∈Ni sin(θˆ
s
i j) > 0 for all s (by phase an-
gle cohesiveness of θˆ si j). We choose α > 0, so that,
max
i=1...n
∣∣∣∣ ∑
j∈Ni
bi j
(
sin(θˆ si j)− sin(θ s
∗
i j )
)∣∣∣∣< α , for all s. Thus, the
steady state angles resulting from unperturbed susceptances
(δ = 0) pertain to the feasibility region (12). In fact, for all
feasible flows (satisfying Assumption 1) the region Pα in
(12) can also be expressed in terms of the perturbed edge
flows as {ξˆ s ∈ Rm, ||I(ξˆ s−ξ s∗)||∞ < α}.
Definition III.1. The optimal allocation robustness margin
is defined by,
R = inf{|δ |, θˆ s 6∈ Pα(θˆ s)}. (13)
This definition implies that the robustness margin is de-
fined by the smallest susceptance drop δ , that steers the
steady state angles θˆ s, outside of their feasiblity region Pα .
At this stage, we ask two fundamental questions:
• For τ(t)→ 0, does the distributed learning algorithm
for optimal allocation by means of the perturbed utility
function (10), converge in probability towards maximiz-
ers of the perturbed potential function (11)?
• Can we identify the robustness margin Rs and determine
its dependence on network parameters/configuration?
We provide answers to these questions in the following
theorem.
Theorem III.2. Consider the power system at steady
state (2) with perturbed weights bˆi j = bi j−δ and the utility
function (10). Let,
Rs = min
i=1,...,n
α+ ∑
j∈Ni
(
bi j(sin(θˆ si j)− sin(θ s
∗
i j ))
)
∑
j∈Ni
sin(θˆ si j)
. (14)
Additionally, consider the cost function (6) with optimal
relative angles, corresponding to unknown configuration of
the power system with perturbed weights bˆi j. Then, the
following holds:
1) The distributed learning algorithm converges as
τ(t)→ 0, to the uniform probability over the set of
best responses, which are maximizers of the perturbed
potential function (11).
2) For every configuration s, the power system model is
robust against perturbations in the susceptances with
a robustness margin given by Rs in (14), if and only if
δ < Rs.
Proof. Consider the cost function (6) with optimal steady
state angles, that solve (3) and (4) with the perturbed weights
bˆi j = bi j−δ . To prove the first statement, we follow the same
lines of the proof of Proposition 3.1 from [17]. For this, we
adopt the proof of Lemma 3.1 to our setup as follows: The
perturbed learning algorithm for optimal allocation induces a
finite, irreducible, aperiodic process over the state space. By
introducing ε = e−1/τ , we denote by Pε the corresponding
transition matrix.
By using the perturbed utility function in (10), we have
lim
ε→0
PεX→X ′
εmaxXi ui(X)−uˆi(X ′)
=
1
n
1
∑
Xi∈Ai
εmaxXi ui(X)−uˆi(X)
< ∞, (15)
with X = (Xi,X−i), X ′= (X ′i ,X−i), if and only if, maxXi
ui(X)−
uˆi(X)≥ 0. This means that, for all Xi /∈ Bi(X−i), we have
ui(X)−max
Xi
ui(X)
∑
j∈Ni
c(Xi,X j)
< δ , (16)
and taking the supremum, yields the lower bound,
R = max
i=1,...,n
ui(X)−max
Xi
ui(X)
∑
j∈Ni
ci(Xi,X j)
< 0. (17)
Since 0 ≤ δ , this shows that R < δ . Hence, Lemma 3.1
holds with the resistance r(X → X ′) = maxXi ui(X)− uˆi(X ′).
Together with Lemma 3.2, Proposition 3.1 in [17] implies
that stochastically stable states are the set of perturbed
potential function maximizers given in (11) .
To prove the second claim, we note that θˆ s /∈ Pα in (12),
if and only if,
| ∑
j∈Ni
bˆi j(δ )sin(θˆ si j)− ∑
j∈Ni
bi j sin(θ s
∗
i j )| ≥ α,
for some i = 1 . . .n. From bˆi j = bi j−δ , we solve for δ , the
resulting inequality,
| ∑
j∈Ni
bi j(sin(θˆ si j)− sin(θ s
∗
i j ))−δ ∑
j∈Ni
sin(θˆ si j)| ≥ α.
This shows that,
δ ≥
α+ ∑
j∈Ni
[
bi j(sin(θˆ si j)− sin(θ s
∗
i j ))
]
∑
j∈Ni
sin(θˆ si j)
,
or
δ ≤
−α+ ∑
j∈Ni
[
bi j(sin(θˆ si j)− sin(θ s
∗
i j ))
]
∑
j∈Ni
sin(θˆ si j)
.
By choice of α and definition of the robustness margin in
(13), only the first inequality holds and we find (14) with
Rs > 0.
B. Discussion
We make the following remarks:
1) Theorem 1 establishes a robustness margin Rs for the
radial power system with respect to a uniform drop in
the susceptance. The robustness margin Rs depends on
the configuration s and on admissible maximal devia-
tion of steady state electrical power from its optimal
value described in (12) and increases with larger α .
Note that, optimal steady state angles of the power
system with perturbed susceptances are in general
unknown, because they require exact knowledge of
δ . In this case, the learning algorithm with perturbed
susceptances does not converge to a maximizer of
Uˆ(t). See later Section IV.
2) A suitable choice for the temperature or noise function
τ(t), as a decreasing function of time, is crucial for the
improvement of the algorithm convergence properties.
The function τ(t) shapes the learning parameter or
exploration rate of the learning algorithm [23].
3) It is worth noting that the convergence in unperturbed
(see Section II-B) as well as perturbed case (in Theo-
rem III.2) is understood only in a probabilistic sense,
that is, a Markov chain X(t) itself can converge to
a Nash equilibrium that is not a maximizer of the
potential function U(X). Hence, the potential function
U(X) is not always necessarily zero at the end of the
learning algorithm.
4) The optimal allocation problem can be regarded in
a broader perspective as a resource allocation prob-
lem [3], where the cost function (6) represents the
welfare function. This can also be formulated as a
task assignment [26], [27] for dynamic multi-agent net-
works, where each node selects its task, i.e., type from
an admissible set and the cost function is interpreted
as utility of an assignment profile for each node with a
specific role. An illustrative example of the distributed
learning in potential games is graph coloring, whose
goal is to find a color assignment, such that none of
two neighboring nodes have the same color. One could
interpret the type set S = {M,C} as the colors with
difference being in the cost function typically used for
coloring algorithm that explicitly depend on the current
configuration, see Section 6.1 in [3].
IV. SIMULATIONS
To illustrate the distributed learning for optimal al-
location algorithm, we study an example of power
systems represented by a line graph of six genera-
tion units, associated with power input vector P0 =
[0.77778,0.7,0.798889,0.7,0.798889,0.7]>. The goal is to
assign a type si ∈ S to each generation unit i = 1, . . . ,6.
The optimal but unknown configuration s∗ shown in Fig-
ure 1 induces given optimal steady state angles, which
are minimizers of the potential function U(t) in (9). The
optimal relative angle differences {θ s∗i j }i, j∈V are given by
[−0.0157,−0.0354,0.0081,0.0750]>.
The distributed learning algorithm for optimal allocation
aims to correctly assign a type (synchronous machine or
DC/AC converter in closed-loop with droop control) and
hence to find the optimal configuration s∗, based on given
optimal angle differences {θ s∗i j }i, j∈V .
Fig. 1. Top: Power system represented by a line graph consisting of 6
generation units connected via inductive lines with susceptances bi j > 0.
Bottom: Unknown optimal configuration s∗ = [M,C,C,C,C,M] correspond-
ing to given optimal relative angles {θ ∗i j}i, j∈V . The color red refers to a
synchronous machine and blue to DC/AC converters (in closed-loop with
droop control).
For simplicity of presentation, we choose between two
colors: red for synchronous machines (M) and blue
for DC/AC converters (C) with respective damping val-
ues (in p.u.) dC = 15 and dM = 25. The susceptances
{bi j}(i, j)∈E are in p.u. and given by the matrix Γ =
diag{[15.2631,4.2350,4.8156,15.2631,4.2350]}. The val-
ues are taken from the IEEE 14-bus system [28].
We begin with the unperturbed (δ = 0) cost function
(6). At initialization, all generation units are assumed to be
synchronous machines, so that Xi(t)=M, i= 1, . . . ,n. At each
time t > 0, a generation unit i∈U(t) is chosen uniformly (at
random) and updates its type si (and hence color), according
to the conditional probability (7). In Figure 2, we plot the
time evolution of the potential function in (9), for two dif-
ferent realizations of the inverse of the temperature function
η(t) = τ−1(t). We notice that an increase in the slope of
η(t) is accompanied by an increase in the convergence rate
to an optimal configuration.
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Fig. 2. Evolution of the potential function U(t) in (9) corresponding to two
different realizations of the inverse of the temperature function η1(t) = t/5
and η2(t) = t/30.
In the sequel, we consider the distributed learning algo-
rithm for optimal allocation with η(t) = t/5. We calculate
max
si∈S
i=1...n
max
i=1...n
| ∑
j∈Ni
bi j(sin(θ si j)− sin(θ s
∗
i j ))|= 0.8142,
and hence pick α = 1.5 > 0.8142, so that θ s ∈ Pα in (12),
for all configurations s. This choice accounts for a large
margin of admissible power deviations induced by bounded
disturbances that might affect power system operation [20].
Next, we perturb the susceptance values given by bˆi j =
bi j−δ , where 0≤ δ < bi j is a uniformly randomly generated
perturbation. The upper bound on the susceptance drop δ
from Theorem III.2 is given by K = min
s,si∈S
i=1,...,n
Rs = 0.4723. In
this case, the resulting steady state angles remain inside the
feasibility region Pα , where for example for δ = 0.0027, we
have that,
max
s,si∈S
i=1,...,n
max
i=1...n
| ∑
j∈Ni
bˆi j(δ )sin(θˆ si j)− ∑
j∈Ni
bi j sin(θ s
∗
i j )|= 0.8862.
Since the optimal configuration s∗ = [s∗1, . . . ,s
∗
n] in Fig-
ure 1, corresponds to steady state angles (3), (4) with
unperturbed line susceptances bi j, Figure 3 shows the per-
turbed potential function (11) (for δ = 0.3065) that does not
converge to zero, but rather to a Nash equilibrium that is not
a minimizer of the perturbed potential Uˆ(t) in (11).
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Fig. 3. Convergence of the perturbed potential function Uˆ(t) in (11) for
δ = 0.3065, to a non-zero value corresponding to a configuration of a Nash
equilibrium, that is not a maximizer of the perturbed potential function.
V. CONCLUSION
We revisited a distributed learning algorithm for opti-
mal allocation in radial power systems based on log-linear
learning with guaranteed probabilistic convergence to Nash
equilibrium. Moreover, we investigated its robustness against
drops in the line susceptances with respect to feasible region
of power deviations at steady state. We validated our results
in simulations of line graph with six generation units. Future
investigations involve generalization of the network topology
and inclusion of more detailed models of synchronous ma-
chines and DC/AC converters in closed-loop with suitable
control.
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